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 Fodor ’ s  Bubbe Meise Against Darwinism 1 
 ELLIOTT  SOBER A
 Fodor writes of the  ‘ alleged conclusion ’ of his  ‘ putative argument, ’ but these 
modest phrases belie the immodesty of what he claims to establish — that  ‘ contrary 
to Darwinism, the theory of natural selection can ’ t explain the distribution of 
phenotypes in biological populations. ’ Fodor ’ s argument begins with the claim 
that such an explanation would have to use the concept of there being selection 
for a trait. The sticking point is that statements of the form  ‘ there was selection 
for trait  T ’ contain an opaque context. Fodor says that for such statements to be 
true, either selection must involve an intentional agent ( ‘ Mother Nature ’ ) who 
consciously chooses or there must be laws  ‘ about the relative ﬁ tness of having the 
traits. ’ But Mother Nature is a myth and there are no such laws. Although Fodor ’ s 
 ‘ alleged conclusion ’ is about a theory and its ability to explain, his argument has 
an entailment that is more purely metaphysical — there are no truth makers for 
propositions about selection-for. If there are no truth-makers, I guess such 
statements cannot be true. Fodor ’ s argument therefore leads to a view of 
statements about selection-for that resembles how emotivists view ethical 
statements. 
 What does  ‘ selection-for ’ actually mean? Fodor ’ s discussion of counterfactuals, 
Mother Nature, and laws skips over a simple point. Selection-for is a causal 
concept. To say that there is selection for trait  T in a population means that having 
 T causes organisms to survive and reproduce better (so having the alternative(s) to 
 T that are present in the population causes organisms to survive and reproduce 
worse). In contrast, to say that there is selection of trait  T just means that individuals 
with  T have a higher average ﬁ tness than do individuals who lack  T ( Sober, 1984 ). 
The word  ‘ cause ’ does not occur in this second deﬁ nition. The expression  ‘ selection 
for  T ’ is opaque while  ‘ selection of  T ’ is transparent. And  ‘ selection for  T ’ is 
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 1  ‘ Bubbe meise ’ is Yiddish for  grandmother ’ s tale and it is often said to mean what  ‘ old wives ’ 
tale ’ means in English. I tend to think that it means  an absurd concoction and has nothing much 
to do with whether the tale is traditional. In any event, Fodor ’ s granny has long been one of 
my favorite philosophers, so it is with regret that I have drawn the conclusion expressed in 
my paper ’ s title. 
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opaque precisely because  T occurs nontransparently in  ‘ a ’ s having  T causes  … ’ . 2 
The thesis that statements of the form  ‘ there was selection for trait  T in population 
 p ’ are never true therefore boils down to the thesis that statements of the form 
 ‘ having trait  T caused better survival and reproduction in population  p ’ are never 
true. This radical conclusion ﬂ ies in the face of the fact that biologists often think 
they have excellent evidence for saying that agricultural pests experienced selection 
for DDT resistance, that there has been selection for dark coloration in moths, and 
on and on. 
 Fodor ’ s beef is not the usual complaint about adaptationists — that their reasoning 
is sloppy or that their evidence is inconclusive. These are epistemological criticisms. 
Fodor is here wearing his metaphysical hat. Even when biologists do experiments 
(either in the laboratory or in the wild) to ﬁ gure out what traits in a natural 
population are being selected-for, they are engaged in a fool ’ s errand. I regard this 
entailment of Fodor ’ s argument as a  reductio of its premises. But where do the 
premises go wrong? 
 Fodor mentions the example of the selection toy that I discussed in my book 
 The Nature of Selection (p. 99). Here is what he says about it: 
 Roughly, Sober imagines a mixed batch of marbles, some square and some 
round, that is run through a ﬁ lter all the holes of which are round. Suppose that 
all the round marbles are red and all the square marbles are some other color. 
Then the sort will pass only red objects even though, Sober points out, there is 
a strong intuition that what this device sorts  for is not color but shape. 
 One might argue that, in the case imagined, although what underlies the 
intuitions about selection for is, as usual, the counterfactuals (green round 
marbles would have gone through had there been any) the counterfactuals are 
covered by, as it were, a  very local law whose domain is restricted to this kind 
of machine. But this strikes my ear as forced, and it ’ s anyhow unnecessary. 
Rather, what grounds the counterfactuals in Sober ’ s example is the structure 
of the mechanism; given how it works, it can ’ t let anything through that isn ’ t 
round. So, one ’ s intuitions about which trait is selected for follow not from 
what one takes to be the laws that govern selection  per se , but rather from what 
one takes to be the story about how this kind of machine works. In fact if one 
takes Sober ’ s example to exemplify the general case, there can be no theory of 
selection  per se : The metaphysics of selection will be as heterogeneous as the 
kind of mechanisms that do the selecting. 
 Fodor here concedes that there is a fact of the matter about what traits are selected-
for in the selection toy. There is selection for being round, not for being red, even 
 2  Fodor correctly notes that the event terms in  ‘ event  e 1 caused event  e 2 ’ occur transparently, 
but this does not undercut the fact that  F and  G occur opaquely in  ‘ a ’ s having  F caused  b ’ s 
having  G , ’ although  a and  b occur transparently. 
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though the two traits are coextensive in the batch of marbles. I think the same is 
true of natural selection. The fact that  ‘ selection for  T ’ is opaque doesn ’ t mean that 
selection-for ﬂ oats free from the facts; the facts, after all, include causal facts. Fodor 
thinks there are no laws about the selection toy; rather, it is properties of the 
 ‘ mechanism ’ that ground the fact that there is selection for shape but not for color. 
Suppose for the moment that this is so. The question then is — why aren ’ t there 
similarly  ‘ mechanisms ’ in nature that ground facts about selection-for? The last 
sentence quoted shows that Fodor thinks that  ‘ mechanisms that do the selecting ’ 
do exist out there in the wild. Apparently, Fodor here repudiates the premise in 
his  ‘ putative argument ’ that says that Mother Nature and laws are the only two 
options for grounding facts about selection-for. 
 This passage and some others suggest that Fodor may not be aiming to show 
that there are no facts about selection-for, even though his  ‘ putative argument ’ 
entails precisely that conclusion. Perhaps we should ignore the passages in which 
he argues that there are no truth-makers for propositions about selection-for and 
focus on the parts of the paper in which he tries to show that there can be no 
 theory about this, and that there can be no such theory because there are no  laws 
about selection-for. After all, his  ‘ alleged conclusion ’ is that  ‘ the theory of natural 
selection can ’ t explain the distribution of phenotypes in biological populations. ’ 
And he takes his argument to show that  ‘ the theory of Natural Selection reduces to a 
banal truth:  “ if a kind of creature ﬂ ourishes in a kind of a situation, then there must 
be something about such creatures (or about such situations, or about both) in 
virtue of which it does so ” [my italics, twice]. ’ 
 Fodor thinks there are no laws about selection-for because of his views about 
the form that such laws would have to take: 
 It simply isn ’ t true, for example, that being big is in general better for ﬁ tness 
than being small except when there are effects of interacting variables; or that 
ﬂ ying slow and high is in general better for ﬁ tness than ﬂ ying fast and low 
except when there are effects of interacting variables; or that being monogamous 
is in general better for ﬁ tness than being polygamous etc except when there 
are effects of interacting variables  … etc. It ’ s not that the underlying 
generalizations are there but imperceptible in the ambient noise. It ’ s rather 
that there ’ s just nothing to choose between (e.g.) the generalization that being 
small is better for ﬁ tness than being big and the generalization that being big 
is better for ﬁ tness than being small. Witness the fact that the world contains 
vastly many creatures of both kinds. 
 Fodor thinks that laws about selection-for must have the form: 
 (1)  If  F and  G are alternative traits in a population, there will be selection 
for  F and against  G ,  ceteris paribus , 
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 where this means: 
 If  F and  G are alternative traits in a population, there will be selection for  F 
and against  G , except when there are effects of intervening variables. 
 For Fodor there are no laws that have these forms because there ’ s  ‘ nothing to 
choose between ’ them and the following two, with which they are incompatible: 
 (2)  If  F and  G are alternative traits in a population, there will be selection 
for  G and against  F ,  ceteris paribus , 
 If  F and G are alternative traits in a population, there will be selection for  G 
and against  F , except when there are effects of intervening variables. 
 Fodor ’ s phrase  ‘ nothing to choose between ’ is to be understood metaphysically, 
not epistemologically. There is no fact of the matter as to which of (1) and (2) is 
true. Hence there are no laws about selection-for. 
 The obvious thing that is missing in both (1) and (2) is a placeholder for the 
kind of environment the population occupies. By  ‘ environment, ’ I mean both 
the abiotic environment (like the weather), the biology of organisms outside the 
population of interest (like its predators, prey, parasites, and diseases), and the other 
traits that organisms in the population possess ( Williams, 1966; Brandon, 1990 ). 
Here is a candidate law that remedies this defect: 
 If producing equal numbers of sons and daughters and producing more 
daughters than sons are the alternative reproductive strategies that a parent 
might follow in a randomly mating population, and if the cost of rearing a son 
is the same as the cost of rearing a daughter, then there will be selection for 
following the ﬁ rst strategy and against following the second. 
 This is a simpliﬁ ed statement of  Fisher ’ s (1930) model of sex ratio evolution. 
Fodor may feel the need to add  ‘ ceteris paribus ’ to this. I tend to think that this 
phrase is too vague to be of much use, though I concede that there may be 
further details that one will need to add to the antecedent. Fodor may claim that 
there is no way to turn the conditional into something true unless  ‘ ceteris paribus ’ 
is added. I disagree, since I think that Fisher ’ s theory is a mathematical truth; the 
consequent follows mathematically from the antecedent once everything is stated 
carefully ( Sober, 1984 ). But this quarrel about whether  ‘ ceteris paribus ’ is necessary 
or helpful does not matter to the main point. There is  everything to choose 
between (1) and (2) once the selectively relevant environment is characterized 
properly. 
 Biologists don ’ t usually use the word  ‘ law ’ to describe such generalizations as 
Fisher ’ s. Rather, they call them  ‘ models ’ . Still, they have the properties that Fodor 
is looking for when he talks about  ‘ laws ’ — they are general, they don ’ t refer to 
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speciﬁ c places, times, or individuals, and they support counterfactuals. 3 It is true 
that they often contain idealizations, but Fodor says he is ok with that. Laws with 
idealizations in them (e.g. ones that describe inﬁ nite populations and the like) are 
still laws. In applying idealized models to real-world populations, one must show 
that their idealizations are  harmless ( Sober, 1993 ); this may be what Fodor means 
when he refers to  ‘ independently justiﬁ ed idealizations. ’ The theory of selection-
for is a collection of such models. There are a number of models of sex ratio 
evolution, and there are groups of models for other interesting phenotypes as 
well — for example, for the evolution of altruism and selﬁ shness ( Sober and 
Wilson, 1998 ). 
 Long before he turned a jaundiced eye on Darwinism,  Fodor (1975) made 
the important point that laws in higher-level sciences are often able to capture 
generalizations that the more ﬁ ne-grained vocabulary used in lower-level 
sciences will be unable to describe. This is because the higher-level science 
describes properties that are  multiply realizable. The property of producing 
equal numbers of sons and daughters and the property of performing an 
altruistic act (that has speciﬁ ed costs and beneﬁ ts, described in terms of their 
ﬁ tness effects) are both multiply realizable, but that does not prevent there 
being laws (or models) about the kinds of circumstances in which there is 
selection for those properties. It is ironic that this Fodorian point is one that 
Fodor denies. 
 Fodor offers another reason for thinking that there can be no laws of selection-
for. He mentions it in the passage quoted above about the selection toy, and 
returns to the same thought at the end of the paper when he offers this 
analogy: 
 For each person who is rich, there must be something or other that explains 
his being so: heredity, inheritance, cupidity, acuity, mendacity, grinding the 
faces of the poor, being in the right place at the right time, having friends in 
high places, sheer brute luck, highway robbery, or whatever. Which things 
conduce to getting rich is, of course, highly context dependent  … [T]he 
extreme context sensitivity of the ways of getting rich makes it most unlikely 
that there could be a theory of  getting rich per se … In particular, it ’ s most 
unlikely that there are generalizations that are lawful (hence counterfactual 
supporting, not  ad hoc , and not vacuous) that specify the various situations in 
which it is possible to get rich and the properties in virtue of which, if one had 
them, one would get rich in those situations. 
 3  If these models are mathematical truths, does that mean they are not laws? This is not Fodor ’ s 
argument and I tend to think that this way of arguing for there being no laws of natural 
selection is sterile and terminological. Whether evolution is  lawful does not depend on 
whether dynamical models are a priori or a posteriori. 
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 There are many causes of getting rich and they are enormously heterogeneous; 
hence there are no laws of getting rich. 4 Notice that theses about  ‘ ceteris paribus ’ 
play no role in this argument. 
 Since Fodor ’ s analog for someone ’ s  ‘ getting rich ’ is a trait ’ s  ‘ being selected-for, ’ 
consider why he doubts that there could be a theory of  ‘ being selected-for per se . ’ If 
there is selection for an even sex ratio in population  p 1 and selection for a particular 
altruistic trait in population  p 2 , what of substance is there to say concerning what 
these two instances of selection-for have in common? I agree — not much. But a 
substantive theory does not have to describe a necessary-and-sufﬁ cient condition 
for someone ’ s getting rich or for there being selection for a trait. Multiple sufﬁ cient 
conditions sufﬁ ce. The kind of circumstance that leads there to be selection for 
producing equal numbers of sons and daughters differs from the kind of circumstance 
that leads there to be selection for altruism. It is this that the theory of natural 
selection describes. Or rather — this is an important  part of the theory. The theory 
includes both source laws and consequence laws ( Sober, 1984 ). There are many 
kinds of circumstance that lead there to be selection-for. What knits these different 
sources together is a set of consequence laws, which describe the consequences for 
trait evolution of selection, both when it occurs alone and when it occurs in 
combination with other possible causes of evolution. The situation here is rather 
like the one in classical physics. There are a number of forces — gravitational, 
electrical, etc. — and each is described by its own source law. These source laws are 
knitted together by a single body of consequence laws. Gravitational and electrical 
forces each obey  F = ma and a principle of composition of causes. 5 
 The distinction between source laws and consequence laws is relevant to the 
ﬁ rst step of Fodor ’ s  ‘ putative argument ’ where he claims that the theory of natural 
selection can ’ t explain the distribution of phenotypes in populations because to do 
so would require using the concept of selection-for. Not so. Consequence laws 
about selection-of provide causal explanations of phenotypic distributions, although 
adding source laws about selection-for provides a more detailed picture of the 
causal facts. For example, if the individuals in a population interact in pairs and 
the average ﬁ tnesses of altruistic ( A ) and selﬁ sh ( S ) individuals are the ones given in 
the accompanying table, then it is more probable than not that  A will increase in 
frequency precisely when  r > c/b , where  r = Pr(actor is  A  │ partner is  A ) — Pr(actor 
is  A  │ partner is  S ). Notice that this generalization is stated in terms of the ﬁ tnesses 
of the two traits. It tells you when there will be selection  of trait  A . 
 4  Rosenberg (1994) argues that there is only one knowable law in biology and that this is 
because ﬁ tness is multiply realizable. It is instructive to compare Fodor ’ s appeal to multiple 
realizability with Rosenberg ’ s. I criticize Rosenberg ’ s argument in  Sober, 1997 . 
 5  When Fodor says that  ‘ evolutionary processes can select for a given phenotypic trait only 
insofar as its interactions with other phenotypic traits can be discounted, ’ he is confusing 
selection-of and selection-for. Correlation of characters inﬂ uences whether a trait favored by 
selection will get selected. See  Brosnan, forthcoming , for discussion of how this should be 
modeled. 
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 48   E. Sober 
 These are my main kvetches about Fodor ’ s  bubba meise , but I do want to mention 
some reservations that I have concerning what he says about historical narrative 
( HN ) explanations. Fodor stipulates that these use transparent constructions like 
 ‘ event  e 1 caused event  e 2 ’ but not opaque constructions like  ‘ selection for trait  T ’ . 
Given what selection-for means, I take it that  HN explanations have no truck with 
constructions of the form  ‘ a ’ s having property  F caused  b to have property  G ’ . If 
this is what  HN explanations are, I doubt that they play much of a role in historical 
sciences. Historical inquiry typically involves asking which  properties of one event 
brought about this or that property of another. Also, Fodor contrasts  HN 
explanations with covering-law explanations, and mentions the origin of the Grand 
Canyon, the Solar System, and the Universe as  explananda that are susceptible of 
 HN , not covering-law, explanation. But don ’ t geologists and physicists cite laws 
(or models), or think of them without bothering to mention them, in explaining 
such events? And if they can ’ t think of them, don ’ t they wish they could? 
 aPhilosophy Department 
 University of Wisconsin — Madison 
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